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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Allen Gillespie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when 
relinquished jurisdiction, or alternatively, when it failed to reduce his sentence sua 
sponte pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). He contends that the district court 
insufficiently considered the mitigating factors in his case when it made the decision to 
revoke. As a result, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order revoking 
probation and remand for a new hearing. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Gillespie entered a binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement with the State, agreeing 
to plead guilty to driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI). (R., pp.18-20.) In 
exchange, he would be sentenced to a unified sentence of seven years, with three 
years fixed, and jurisdiction would be retained. (R., p.19.) The district court would 
specifically recommend the CAPP rider program. 1 (R., p.19.) Mr. Gillespie also agreed 
to waive "his appeal and Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) He offered that plea at his 
arraignment. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.1, Ls.4-12l The district court accepted the I.C.R. 11 
agreement. 3 (Tr., Vo1.2, p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.5, p.14, Ls.14-17; see also R., pp.46-47.) 
1 The CAPP program is specifically designed to present intensive treatment focused 
on substance abuse issues. Idaho Dep't of Correction, "Correctional Alternative 
Placement Program (CAPP)," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentllocations/prisons/ 
correctional_alternative_placement_program. 
2 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently-paginated volumes. 
To avoid confusion, the volume containing the arraignment hearing held on March 25, 
2011, will be referred to as "VoI.1." The volume containing the sentencing hearing held 
on June 6,2011, will be referred to as "VoI.2." 
3 The Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) noted Mr. Gillespie's desire to 
accept responsibility for his actions as well as the impact his mental conditions 
1 
His sentence was ordered to be concurrent to the sentences arising from three, related 
misdemeanors, to which Mr. Gillespie had also pled guilty. (Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.13; 
R, pp.5-10.) 
Rather than place Mr. Gillespie in the CAPP program, the Department of 
Correction placed him in the Therapeutic Community rider program because he did not 
meet the Department's educational requirements for the CAPP program at that time.4 
As placement in the CAPP program had been a major component of the I.C.R. 11 
agreement, Mr. Gillespie filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the district court place him 
on probation as a result of the Department of Correction's decision to place him in the 
TC rider program. (R., pp.53-58.) The district court denied the motion because the 
decision to send Mr. Gillespie to the TC program was not unreasonable and the 
agreement did not bind the Department of Correction. 5 (R., pp.81-82.) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Gillespie was able to be somewhat successful during his 
period of retained jurisdiction. He did not receive any formal disciplinary reports, and 
(depression and dyslexia) have had. (PSI, pp.18-19.) It also noted that Mr. Gillespie 
had been sexually abused by his stepfather, an incident which had gone unaddressed 
in his life. (PSI, p.14.) As a result, he presents in the moderate range of victimization. 
(GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS), p.12.) He also 
has employable skills as a heating and cooling technician. (PSI, p.16.) Ultimately, the 
presentence investigator recommended that Mr. Gillespie participate in the CAPP 
program during a period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.19.) 
4 The therapeutic community, or TC, rider program focuses on helping participants 
develop community relationships by focusing on building a "pro-social lifestyle." Idaho 
Dep't of Correction, "Programming," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentlprisons/cl/ 
sbwcc/programming. The TC program is designed to reshape behaviors, attitudes and 
values, helping to resocialize the participant in preparation for release on probation. As 
part of that process, participants are required to attend a substance-abuse-specific 
program. Idaho Dep't of Correction Standard Operating Procedure 607.26.01.011, 
Version 2.7, pp.3-4, available at http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/policy/ 
therapeutic_community. 
5 Neither the State nor the district court argued for denial based on the waiver of Rule 
35 relief in the agreement. (See generally R., pp.65-66, 81-82.) 
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the only informal report was for exceeding the permitted number of telephone calls 
during one week. (Addendum to PSI (hereinafter APSI), p.2; C-Notes (attached to 
ASPI), p.1.) The APSI noted that, while he was disconcerted with his placement in the 
TC, as oppose to the CAPP, program, he was able to recognize some of the factors 
contributing to his behavior and began to work toward correcting them. (See APSI, p.2 
("He can admit that his need for instant gratification has created negative 
consequences .... He seems to continue to struggle with taking responsibility for his 
criminal thinking and behavior. At times he has been able to show that he can follow 
the rules .... ").) For example, in regard to his rehabilitation in the relapse prevention 
group, "Mr. Gillespie is both up and down, insightful and in denial, and receives and 
struggles with feedback in RPG. At times, he is open to feedback, willing to participate, 
and can articulate insights." (Footprints Therapeutic Community Discharge Summary 
(hereinafter, Discharge Summary) (attached to APSI), p.2.) He also would have 
adequate support from his family. (APSI, p.3.) He had two verified places he could live 
on release, one with his brother, the other with his mother. (C-Notes, p.2.) However, 
he was not able to complete all his assigned programs. (APSI, p.1.) Because of his 
incomplete rehabilitation, the report recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction. (APSI Recommendation Notice.) 
The district court accepted that recommendation without a hearing and 
relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.86-87.) Thereafter, Mr. Gillespie moved for the district 
court to reconsider its decision. (R., p.88.) The district court decided that this 
3 
information was unpersuasive and denied Mr. Gillespie's motion.6 (R., pp.106-07.) 
Mr. Gillespie timely appealed from that order. (R., pp.1 08-12.) 
6 Because this constitutes a second or successive Rule 35 motion, that decision is not 
challenged on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 200-01 (Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Wers/and, 125 Idaho 499,504-05 (1994); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 
439 (Ct. App. 2011). 
4 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over 
Mr. Gillespie, or alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule 
35 when it did so. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Gillespie, Or Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte 
Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Did So 
A Introduction 
Mr. Gillespie asserts that, when the district court relinquished jurisdiction in his 
case, it failed to sufficiently consider all the factors at play in his rehabilitative process, 
particularly those which demonstrated that he was beginning to make progress in that 
process and those which showed that he was in a position to continue making progress 
if released on probation. However, the district court decided to forego that opportunity 
because Mr. Gillespie had not been perfect in his first rehabilitative opportunity. That 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, and this Court should provide the appropriate 
remedy. 
B. The Waiver Of Appellate Relief Included In The I.C.R. 11 Plea Agreement Does 
Not Extend To An Appeal From The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction 
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine whether Mr. Gillespie's claim is 
justiciable. His plea agreement contained the following language: "The Defendant 
waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) However, Mr. Gillespie 
contends that this waiver does not bar the present appeal. 
While appellate waivers are permissible, "I.C.R. 11 (d)(1 ),7 [is] a rule adopted by 
this Court which specifically contemplates plea agreements in which the defendant 
waives his right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court." State v. Murphy, 
125 Idaho 456, 457 (1994) (emphasis added). Entry of judgment and sentencing can 
7 I.C.R. 11 was amended in 2007. See I.C.R. 11. Currently, section (f)(1) discusses the 
ability of the defendant to waive his appellate rights pursuant to a plea agreement. 
I.C.R.11(f)(1) 
6 
only occur once, at the sentencing hearing. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 
(2001). It cannot occur after a period of jurisdiction has been served by the defendant. 
Id. Therefore, the defendant's opportunity to appeal the judgment and sentence of the 
court arises only from the original judgment of conviction and a waiver of those rights 
does not extend to a subsequent ruling to relinquish jurisdiction. 
This is true even though the default rule for periods of retained jurisdiction is that, 
without an affirmative decision to place the defendant on probation, he will remain 
incarcerated. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808,812 (Ct. App. 2010). That is 
because the order relinquishing jurisdiction is not coextensive with the judgment of 
conviction. For example, a period of retained jurisdiction enlarges the filing period for 
"an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment," but does not extend 
the filing period in regard to any other appeal challenging other aspects of the judgment. 
I.AR. 14(a) (emphasis added). Ultimately, when a defendant seeks relief from an order 
relinquishing jurisdiction (i.e., "reconsideration" of that order), "[r)elief from such an order 
more appropriately should be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Roberts, 126 
Idaho 920, 922 (1995) (emphasis added); I.AR. 11 (C)(9).8 As such, pursuant to 
I.AR. 11 (c)(9), Mr. Gillespie may appeal a decision to relinquish jurisdiction of right. 
Roberts, 126 Idaho at 922. His waiver only extended to the judgment of conviction and 
the sentence contained therein. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457; I.AR. 14(a). Therefore, he 
retained the right to challenge the decision to relinquish jurisdiction itself, a right which 
he now exercises on direct appeal. 
8 I.AR. 11 addresses which orders which are appealable as a matter of right and should 
not be confused with I.C.R. 11, which addresses guilty pleas. 
7 
Even if this Court finds that precedent to be unpersuasive, it should still permit 
this appeal to proceed because the waiver clause is ambiguous. The waiver clause 
states only that "[t]he Defendant waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R, 
p.19.) This clause is ambiguous, as it is unspecific as to the scope of that waiver, 
particularly as to whether it extends to every potential future ruling in this case (for 
example, whether to relinquish jurisdiction, or whether to grant relief pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2604).9 Every other provision of the agreement is specific. (See, e.g., R, p.18-20.) 
For example, the sentencing provision of the agreement provides as follows: 
2. The Defendant shall be sentenced to 36 months fixed and 48 months 
indeterminate, with credit for time served and the court to retain 
Jurisdiction and recommend placement in the CAPP program during the 
retained jurisdiction. If the Defendant successfully completes the retained 
jurisdiction, the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and 
place the defendant on supervised probation for a period of four (4) years. 
The Defendant's driver's license shall be suspended for five (5) years with 
absolutely no driving privileges. 
(R, p.19.) That provision is detailed in the extreme and leaves no room for debate 
about how long Mr. Gillespie was to be sentenced, how long his period of probation was 
to be, how long his license would be suspended, and to which rider program he should 
have been sent. 1O (See R, p.19.) Contrarily, the waiver clause is nowhere near as 
specific, ambiguously leaving open questions about whether Mr. Gillespie could pursue 
9 I.C. § 19-2604 empowers the district court to afford various forms of relief, such as 
reduction, or even dismissal, of charges following successful participation in a drug 
court program, a period of retained jurisdiction, or a period of probation. I.C. § 19-2604. 
Given that Mr. Gillespie was bargaining specifically for participation in the CAPP rider 
program (see R, p.53), it is axiomatic that he would want to retain the ability to 
challenge a future denial of a motion in that regard. 
10 The agreement could have simply provided that the district court would retain 
jurisdiction, but instead, it specifically identified the CAPP program as the rider program 
contemplated and anticipated as a result of the agreement. (See R, p.53 (arguing the 
same point).) 
8 
future relief (or appeals from denials thereof), particularly if facts unknown at the time of 
the plea agreement were to come to light or certain situations arise. (See R., p.19.) 
Plea agreements are like contracts, and thus, are analyzed pursuant to contract 
law standards. State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11 (Ct. App. 2003). Ambiguities in 
plea agreements are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. 11 State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 593, 595 (2010); see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) 
(declaring that the rule of lenity requires ambiguous agreements to be resolved in favor 
of the defendant, regardless of policy and legislative history). This is because the focus 
of a plea agreement is "'on the defendant's reasonable understanding [which] also 
reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.'" 
State v. Nienburg, _ P.3d Docket Number 38656, p.4 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (in turn quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 
1337 n.7)) (emphasis from Nienburg), reh'g denied. As such, the ambiguous waiver 
clause should be construed in Mr. Gillespie's favor. As discussed supra, there are 
several scenarios, such as the potential for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, which 
could have unfolded and in which Mr. Gillespie, by the very bargain he struck, would 
likely not have desired to waive appellate options. See Nienburg, Docket Number 
38656, p.4. Therefore, the waiver would not extend to appeals from decisions other 
than the original imposition of sentence and judgment of conviction. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Gillespie's Probation 
Without Sufficiently Considering the Mitigating Factors In The Record 
11 Notably, in this case, the State drafted the I.C.R. 11 agreement. (R., p.18 ("COME 
NOW, The Plaintiff, State of Idaho ... ").) Therefore, even putting aside the rule of lenity 
and assessing the agreement under general contract principles, ambiguities in this 
agreement would be construed against the State as the drafting party. See, e.g., 
Haener v. Ada County Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 173 (1985); Freeman & Co. v. 
Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 156 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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Mr. Gillespie asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed, was 
an abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within 
the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection 
of society." Id. The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether 
probation or incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing 
I.C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered 
inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Chavez, 134 
Idaho at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). Accordingly, in 
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Gillespie must show that, in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. See 
id. at 312. 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also 
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. To oh ill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is 
10 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in 
sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482,489-90 (Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 
Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those factors are 
present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it crafted its 
disposition in regard to Mr. Gillespie. As a result, it did not sufficiently consider whether 
Mr. Gillespie's probation was adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether 
society required protection from Mr. Gillespie through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 
Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
The first factor requiring sufficient consideration was the underlying issue of 
Mr. Gillespie's abusive childhood. See, e.g., State v. Wifliamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 
(Ct. App. 2001) (considering the defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a 
precursor to the abuse of various narcotic substances and the impact that played on the 
offense). The PSI reported that Mr. Gillespie, along with his brothers, had been 
sexually abused by one of his step-fathers. (PSI, p.14.) This event continues to impact 
Mr. Gillespie, as he scores in the moderate range of victimization. (GRRS, p.12.) He 
11 
did not seek, nor was he provided, with counseling or treatment to address the effects of 
this abuse. (See PSI, p.14.) He would also likely benefit from counseling in this regard, 
as it may be an underlying cause of his depression. (See PSI, p.1?) Therefore, as in 
Williamson, that traumatic past needed to be sufficiently considered in regard to its 
impact on his current struggles with alcohol. See Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620. 
Additionally, the district court needed to sufficiently consider Mr. Gillespie's 
mental condition. Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but requires, the trial court 
to consider a defendant's mental illness or condition as a sentencing factor. See Hollon 
v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Gillespie has been diagnosed with depression, 
which continues to affect him. (PSI, pp.16-17.) In addition, he has been diagnosed with 
dyslexia. (PSI, p.16.) This condition led to his placement in a special education class 
beginning in second grade. (PSI, p.16.) And while he was able to complete classes 
through ninth grade, he still has a low reading level. (PSI, p.16.) This is important since 
it means that his efforts to complete rehabilitative programs might be slower than 
otherwise expected. It does not mean that he is unable to rehabilitate, just that it might 
take longer, which is another reason not to forego such opportunities because he was 
not perfect during his period of retained jurisdiction. Without sufficiently considering 
such factors, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction cannot be a 
reasonable exercise of its discretion. See Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581; Cook, 145 Idaho 
at 490. 
Furthermore, the district court needed to consider the efforts Mr. Gillespie made 
during his period of retained jurisdiction. As there were deeply embedded issues, such 
12 
as the sexual abuse issue, his struggles to fully rehabilitate are not remarkable. 12 
Nonetheless, he was beginning to make progress in his rehabilitative efforts. (See, e.g., 
PSI, pp.2-3; Discharge Summary, 2; R., pp.93-95.) Just because those efforts were not 
perfect is not a sufficient reason to abandon rehabilitative alternatives. See Cook, 145 
Idaho at 489 (recognizing that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the 
prison to continue detaining a person if age or rehabilitation can or does reduce the risk 
of recidivism); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) (same). Cook and 
Eubank reveal that providing rehabilitative alternatives may provide more protection for 
society in the long term. Furthermore, the timing of that rehabilitation is an important 
consideration when addressing rehabilitation. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 
(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 
639. In this case, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction cut off a timely rehabilitation 
process. That process should have been given more time, not cut short, as doing so 
decreased the overall protection the sentence affords society, and thus, the decision 
fails to promote two of the recognized sentencing objective, including the paramount 
goal of protecting society. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
Evidencing Mr. Gillespie's rehabilitative progress and ongoing rehabilitative 
potential, he accepted responsibility from the beginning. For example, he pled guilty at 
his arraignment hearing. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.1, LsA-12.) He accepted responsibility for his 
actions and also offered his sincere apologies to the officers he had resisted and 
assaulted. (See R., pp.7-10; PSI, pp.3, 18.) Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance 
12 Mr. Gillespie was only about three years old when the abuse began. (PSI, p.14.) He 
was thirty-seven when he was sentenced. (PSI, p.1.) 
13 
of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State 
v Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,815 (Ct App. 2010). By making these two acknowledgements, 
Mr. Gillespie demonstrated that he has taken these critical first steps. 
Finally, he presented sUbstantial evidence of the support offered by his family 
and community. (See, e.g., R., pp.93-105.) Such a support network is an important 
commodity which helps the rehabilitation process, and which, if present, needs to be 
sufficiently considered in regard to the decision to forego probation. See Kellis, 148 
Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence 
does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying 
that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy 
of consideration). In particular, Mr. Gillespie has ongoing familial support, as both his 
brother and his mother are willing and able to provide him with a place to live. 
(C-Notes. p.2.) He reported that the people he socialized with regularly were all 
gainfully employed or attending school full time, and that none were involved in illegal 
activity. (GRRS, p.11.) That continuing community support needed to be sufficiently 
considered by the district court. See Kef/is, 148 Idaho at 817. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one 
which considers rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence. 
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still 
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a 
sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the 
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court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). In addition to restricting his 
liberty at the discretion of the Board of Corrections and the looming sentence, he is also 
deprived of several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a 
felony offense, Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to revoke the probation 
and execute the original sentence if Mr. Gillespie were to fail to adhere to the terms of 
his probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives 
properly addressed. What the probationary period provides that a term sentence does 
not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing him to apply the 
lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 
As such, given a sufficient consideration of all the factors, the district court's 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction is revealed to be an abuse of its discretion. Therefore, 
this Court should provide Mr, Gillespie with an appropriate remedy, and either reduce 
his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand for a new determination by the district 
court. 
D. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing 
Mr. Gillespie's Sentences Sua Sponte Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Revoked His 
Probation 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Gillespie's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte 
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. When the district court decides to resume the 
execution of a previously-suspended sentence, as it does when it revokes probation, it 
also has the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State 
V. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) 
The decision to not reduce a sentence that was pronounced, but suspended, will 
be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
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Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a 
decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among others, 
To oh ill, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the record. 
See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should result in a more 
lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Therefore, for all the reasons discussed in Section (B), supra, the district court 
abused its discretion by not reducing Mr. Gillespie's sentence sua sponte, even if only in 
recognition of his successful efforts on probation to that point. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gillespie respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2012. 
BRIAN R DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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